'In this book I argue that the correct philosophical theory of perception is a representative one. By such a theory I mean one which holds
(1) that the immediate objects of (visual) perception are always mental;
(2) that there are objects, variously called external, material or physical, which are independent of the existence of sentient creatures;
(3) that these objects have only the primary qualities;
and
(4) to (visually) perceive a material object is to be in a certain kind of perceptual state as a causal result of the action of that object.'
(Jackson, Frank (1977): Perception, 1)
'... for a given person at a given time, there cannot be more than one unitary state of a given kind. For instance, there cannot be more cases of persons being warm (happy) in a room than there are persons. If this were not so, if there might be two unitary states of a given kind for one person at one time, there would be no sense to the claim that such states were, in some substantial sense, nothing over and above the one subject in these states. Therefore, if the state theorist insists that the sensation states - the sensings - are unitary, rather than relational states like being happy at ... or being warmer than ..., it appears he has a theory significantly distinct from the act-object theory.'
(Jackson, Frank (1977): Perception, 59)
'Many of the terms that we use to describe material things may also be used to describe visual hallucinations; both may be said to be red, triangular, moving, and so on. ... How is this striking fact to be explained? Obviously, it is not a linguistic accident, a fantastic fluke in the development of English (and, of course, a similar situation exists in French, German, Russian, etc.) that 'triangular', for example, may apply equally to an after-image and a figure in chalk on the back-board, or that 'in my foot' may apply equally to pain and a blood vessel. The simplest explanation, and, thus, in the absence of strong contrary indication, the best, is that both after-images and chalk figures may have the same property, that of being triangular, and, hence, may warrant the same linguistic description; and, likewise, both pains and blood vessels may have the same property, that of being located in the foot, and, hence, may warrant the same linguistic description; But this explanation is only available to one who acknowledges the existence of after-images and pains. For if they do not exist, they cannot have any properties at all, and, a fortiori, cannot have the same property as a chalk figure or a blood vessel.'
(Jackson, Frank (1977): Perception, 72-73)
'For those experiences particularly relevant to our perception of color, the process involves the action of light reflected from the object into the eye. And the role of the object is essentially that of modifying the wave-length composition of the light, and the properties of the object which effect this modification are scientific ones like the texture and the molecular structure of its surface.'
(Jackson, Frank (1977): Perception, 124-125)
'Just as the representationalist cannot establish observationally a correlation between sense-data of certain kinds and objects of certain kinds, because he cannot allow that objects may be observed independently of observing sense-data; equally the direct realist cannot establish observationally a correlation between the colour something looks to have and the colour it actually has, because he cannot allow that the colour something has may be observed independently of observing the colour it looks to have. Observing the colour an object actually has is observing the colour it looks to have in the case where the two are the same: there are not two ways of observing an object -- one giving the colour it looks to have, the other the real colour. Observation just gives, necessarily, the apparent colour, which may or may not be the real colour.
What the direct realist must do to justify his beliefs about the colours of objects hypothetico-deductively, by noting that an object's having a certain colour or shape or distance away from one would explain its looking the colours, shapes, etc. it does and would lead to predictions which may be checked. So we see that the direct realist is committed to a hypothetico-deductive approach in the same way as the representationalist.
The general position is this. The representationalist and the direct realist differ profoundly over the ontology of the looks-is distinction, but are in the same situation regarding the epistemology of the distinction.'
(Jackson, Frank (1977): Perception, 149)
 
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