'Indeed, I am inclined to think that, sooner or later, we will all have to give up on the Turing story as a general account of how the mind works, ... considerations about the globality of some kinds of mental processes suggest that cognition can’t consist just of syntactic operations on mental representations.'
(Fodor, Jerry A. (2000): The Mind Doesn't Work That Way, 47)
'The thing to keep in mind is that, as things now stand, nobody knows how to design any cognitive architecture that is plausibly what evolution selected when it selected minds like ours. Since there is such a lot that we don't know about how the mind works (I think I may have mentioned that), it follows that there's a lot we don't know about how selection pressures determined how the mind works. If they did.'
(Fodor, Jerry A. (2000): The Mind Doesn't Work That Way, 71)
'It is, however, the next step in the argument from teleology to evolutionary psychology that I balk at, namely, that the (only?) way to secure the notion of function that biology and cognitive science require is by appealing to Darwin, and specifically, by assuming that the organ whose function one is trying to figure out evolved under selection pressure, and that the function of an organ is that whatever it was selected for. ... it is far from evident that the notion of natural teleology that evolutionary theory supplies is the one that teleological explanation in biology and psychology require. ... Imagine, just as a thought experiment, that Darwin was completely wrong about the origin of species (we all make mistakes). Would it the follow that the function of the heart is not to pump the blood?'
(Fodor, Jerry A. (2000): The Mind Doesn't Work That Way, 85)
'Our brains are, at least by any gross measure, very similar to those of apes; but our minds are, at least by any gross measure, very different. So it looks as though relatively small alterations to the neurology must have produced very large discontinuities ("saltations," as one says) in cognitive capacities in the transition from the ancestral apes to us. It that's right, then there is no reason at all to believe that our cognition was shaped by the gradual action of Darwinian selection on prehuman behavioral phenotypes.'
(Fodor, Jerry A. (2000): The Mind Doesn't Work That Way, 88)
'... I suppose that the moral will eventually be conceded; namely, that the Computational Theory is probably true at most of only the mind's modular parts.'
(Fodor, Jerry A. (2000): The Mind Doesn't Work That Way, 99)