'To summarize this brief account, the veridical visual perceptual scene contains two distinct phenomena: an ontologically objective state of affairs in the world outside your head and an ontologically subjective visual experience of that state of affairs entirely inside your head. The former causes the latter, and the intentional content of the latter determines the former as its condition of satisfaction.'
(Searle, John R. (2015): Seeing Things As They Are, 17)
'... in both the hallucination and the veridical case we are "aware of" or "conscious of" something. But this claim is ambiguous because it contains two senses of "aware of" ...'
(Searle, John R. (2015): Seeing Things As They Are, 24)
'The most important thing to reemphasize is that in the subjective visual field, nothing is seen. This is not because the entities in the subjective visual field are invisible, but rather because their existence is the seeing of objects in the objective visual field. One thing you cannot see when you see anything is your seeing of that thing.'
(Searle, John R. (2015): Seeing Things As They Are, 107)
'How is life possible in a world of nonliving matter? How is consciousness possible in a world of unconscious matter? How is intentionality possible in a world of unrepresenting matter? These are not philosophical questions. The first is being answered by evolutionary biology, and I think the second and third questions about consciousness and intentionality are being answered by neurobiology.'
(Searle, John R. (2015): Seeing Things As They Are, 118)
'... being a tree is not a basic perceptual feature. The basic perceptual features in this case are colors, shapes, textures, etc. Even depth, as we have seen, is not a basic perceptual feature, and this is shown by the fact that of seeing the three-dimensional aspect of the tree can be produced by the perception of a two-dimensional surface.'
(Searle, John R. (2015): Seeing Things As They Are, 150-151)