'It is useful to see self-representationalism as the upshot of two claims. The first is that all phenomenally conscious states are conscious in virtue of being represented (in the right way). The second is that no phenomenally conscious state is conscious in virtue of being represented by a numerically distinct state – that is, a state other than itself.'
(Kriegel, Uriah (2009): Subjective Consciousness. A Self-Representational Theory, 15)
'What is mystifying about the reddish phenomenal character of your conscious experience is how it could be constituted by the electro-chemical activity of gray matter.'
(Kriegel, Uriah (2009): Subjective Consciousness. A Self-Representational Theory, 65)
'To say that the property of appearing blue16 is response-dependent is thus to say that there is a certain response R, a certain set of respondents S, and certain conditions K, such that the following biconditional is true a priori: x appears blue16 iff x is such as to produce x-directed R in S under K.'
(Kriegel, Uriah (2009): Subjective Consciousness. A Self-Representational Theory, 88)
'On the self-representational view, that would entail that what it is for a mental content to be conscious is for it to be carried by a self-representing state. The idea is that we start by trying to understand what makes a mental state conscious, and then by extension speak of contents as conscious when they are carried by conscious states.'
(Kriegel, Uriah (2009): Subjective Consciousness. A Self-Representational Theory, 127)
'It seems conceivable, on the face of it, that a zombie should harbor self-representing internal states. These states would represent themselves but would not be conscious. If so, one might reason, self-representation is insufficient for subjective character.'
(Kriegel, Uriah (2009): Subjective Consciousness. A Self-Representational Theory, 157)
 
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